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In late July 1994, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) began an
unprecedented sale of the airwaves.
Large segments of radio spectrum (fre-
quencies) were sold in a series of auc-
tions, enabling firms to provide new tele-
communications services. First to be sold
were 4,900 radio licenses for two-way
paging services, voice messaging, and
data services, allowing receipt of faxes
by hand-held devices, for example.
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Next to be sold are about 2,000 licenses
for wireless telephone services known as
personal communications services
(PCS). PCS systems will transmit calls
via radio waves using digital technology.
As with current cellular telephone sys-
tems, there will be many "base stations,"
and calls will be relayed from station to
station as the caller moves around.
The use of auctions to allocate radio
spectrum was mandated by Congress
when it amended the Communications
Act in 1993. In designing the auctions,
the FCC has built on the experience of
previous spectrum auctions in Australia,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
This action marks the first time that the
airwaves have been sold by the federal
government. Until last July, licenses had
been allocated through comparative
hearings or lotteries, both of which con-
sumed substantial resources but failed to
raise any revenue. The mounting federal
debt was a major impetus for the auc-
tions, and the initial series of auctions in
fact raised far more than initial govern-
ment estimates had predicted.
In addition to their favorable impact on
the federal debt, the auctions will in-
crease competition and lower rates for
the approximately 17 million current
cellular telephone users, while also pro-
viding higher-quality service. This Eco-
nomic Commentary examines the ration-
ale for using auctions to allocate radio
spectrum. A secondary focus is on the
impact of firms' capitalization on their
bidding. In the past, concern that small
firms did not have sufficient capital to
compete with larger firms led to many
government giveaways. Moreover, pref-
erential treatment for small firms has had
undesirable side effects. In particular, set-
asides, which reserve certain licenses for
bidding by small firms only, reduce bid-
ding competition and lower revenue.
The formats chosen for the spectrum
auctions avoid many of the problems
associated with the earlier allocation
schemes. Although some set-asides have
been used, allowing small firms to pay
in installments mitigates their capital
constraints and permits them to be more
aggressive bidders.
• Allocation of Publicly
Owned Assets
The federal government has frequently
used auctions to allocate publicly owned
assets. The best-known examples are
Treasury bill and Treasury bond auc-
tions. Others include auctions of timber
harvesting rights and mineral extraction
rights, as well as real estate (by the Res-
olution Trust Corporation). None of
these auctions is controversial, and their
For the first time in U.S. history, the
federal government has begun a sale
of the airwaves. Sales of radio spec-
trum, conducted in a series of auc-
tions last summer, will promote new
telecommunications services, and
upcoming auctions will sell licenses
for wireless telephone systems known
as personal communications services.
These activities represent an appeal-
ing way to allocate scarce resources,
will help put a dent in the federal
debt, and will be fair to small firms
facing capital constraints.
longevity suggests that auctions may be
an appropriate method for allocating
such assets. Yet in many other cases,
bidding is not used.
Political considerations have limited the
use of auctions, resulting in the award-
ing of assets with little or no payment.
Radio and television licenses and cellu-
lar telephone licenses provide cases in
point. (No fee was charged in the cellu-
lar telephone lotteries, other than for
nominal processing.) In the airline in-
dustry, takeoff and landing slots were
simply given to incumbent carriers after
the Airline Deregulation Act was passed.
Such giveaways represent transfers
from the federal government (and thus
from taxpayers) to small groups of firms
or individuals. They also generate sub-
stantial lobbying aimed at maintaining
the status quo.In many other settings, assets have been
allocated without bidding because of a
belief that auctions are somehow
inequitable. For instance, bidding is not
typically used to allocate office space for
university faculty or study carrels for
graduate students, presumably to avoid
having the spoils go only to the wealthy.
There are notable exceptions, however.
At the University of California at Los
Angeles, graduate students in economics
bid for study carrels, and the Economics
Department at Arizona State University
has allocated offices through an
auction.
2 These examples suggest that
economists give relatively more weight
to efficiency—the idea that an asset
should be deployed where it is valued
most highly—than to equity.
When office space or a study carrel is
allocated by a non-auction mechanism,
the winner is typically unable to convey
the office or carrel to someone else. In
other settings, however, resale is com-
mon. For example, the Bureau of Land
Management estimated that fewer than
5 percent of the winners of onshore oil
and gas lease lotteries actually engaged
in exploration.
3 The FCC now estimates
that of all the cellular telephone licenses
awarded to firms other than local tele-
phone companies, 85 percent had been
resold by 1992. The value of those latter
licenses could be as high as $10 billion,
but the federal government received no
money for them.
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Resale tends to put the license in the
hands of the firm that is willing to pay
the most, which is what an auction
would accomplish in the first place. In
addition, spectrum currently used for a
television station could be employed for
cellular telephone service or PCS,
thereby providing much greater benefits.
Allowing resale of spectrum or changes
in its utilization (subject to controls on
issues such as interference with existing
users) will tend to put spectrum to the
use that benefits society the most. Resale
can also make the initial bidding more
competitive, because bidders foresee the
possibility of selling to another firm in
the future. Thus, permitting resale tends
to be beneficial.
• Benefits of Auctions
When Congress instructed the FCC to
allocate radio spectrum, it could have
mandated any of several different meth-
ods, including lotteries, comparative hear-
ings, first-come first-served, and auctions.
A lottery can certainly raise revenue, but
there is often a significant delay before
service begins, since many of the licenses
will be resold. When the FCC used open
lotteries for cellular telephone licenses, it
took more than a year for service to be-
gin, on average. In addition, because the
fees were so low and the values of the
licenses were so high, nearly 400,000
applicants clamored for an opportunity.
Processing these applications imposed a
massive cost on the FCC.
Comparative hearings have been used
extensively to award radio and television
licenses. Drawbacks to their use again
include the cost (to the FCC and the
applicants) and the delay. In "stream-
lined hearings," the FCC took an aver-
age of two years to award cellular tele-
phone licenses in the top 30 markets. If
the PCS licenses were allocated by hear-
ings, the process would take several
years, and millions of dollars would be
spent attempting to influence the out-
come. And if licenses were awarded on a
first-come first-served basis, there is a
danger that inferior technologies would
be used in a rush to be first.
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Auctions avoid many of the drawbacks
of these other schemes. In an auction, the
object for sale is awarded to the bidder
who offers to pay the most. Because this
bidder is typically the one who values the
object most highly, the outcome is effi-
cient. Moreover, under plausible condi-
tions, a simple auction yields the maxi-
mum possible revenue to the seller.
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Even though auctions have many appeal-
ing features, however, additional issues
must be raised—chiefly, how to respond
to the existence of capital constraints.
• Capital Constraints
Whenever auctions are used to allocate
government-owned assets, some small
bidders claim to be at a disadvantage rel-
ative to their larger counterparts. The
implication is that large firms, by virtue
of greater financial clout, can outbid the
smaller firms. If bidders face capital
constraints, there may be a divergence
between how highly a bidder values the
good and what he is able to pay.
For illustrative purposes, consider a bid-
der seeking to buy a small business. The
business is worth $250,000 to the bidder
in the sense that this is the maximum he
would pay in the absence of any capital
constraint. The bidder may have at his
disposal only $10,000, however. He may
be able to get a loan to purchase the busi-
ness, but will have difficulty doing so
and will face a high interest rate. In this
sense, the bidder has a severe capital con-
straint. If many of the bidders confront
such constraints, then the seller may find
it optimal to offer below-market interest
rates to increase competition.
Capital constraints are present in many
other cases, although not as dramatically.
The bidder could be a firm that faces a
high cost of capital because its cash flow
is low. Again, a divergence occurs
between the value of the object to the
bidder and what he is able to pay. These
issues are of paramount importance
because of the popular, but largely
unfounded, belief that small firms create
a disproportionate share of net new jobs,
which creates pressure to give small
firms preferential treatment.
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In government auctions, there is anecdo-
tal evidence of concern about the limited
financial resources of bidders. For exam-
ple, the federal government has limited
the length and size of mineral leases,
thereby making small firms more com-
petitive.
8 In timber rights auctions, set-
aside sales have been made available
exclusively to small firms. Royalty pay-
ments, which are popular in mineral
rights auctions, provide a method of
spreading the winner's payments across
periods, thereby mitigating the impact of
the current capital constraint.
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Researchers Kenneth Hendricks and
Robert Porter provide additional evi-
dence of the importance of capital con-
straints.
1
0 Since 1975, Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS) regulations have permitted
joint bidding by all but the eight largest
firms. The authors study bidding behav-
ior on OCS leases for the period 1954-
1979, focusing on the impact of jointbidding on bids and profit rates. Their
findings on the profitability of joint ven-
tures involving a large firm and small
fringe firms are of particular interest.
Formation of the joint ventures appar-
ently leads to more competitive bidding.
The authors suggest that these joint ven-




Even if one accepts the argument that
small firms are at a relative disadvantage,
there remains the question of how to
assist them. Bidders with low liquid
assets will be able to compete effectively
in auctions if 1) they can pay in install-
ments, 2) they are given "bidding cred-
its" so that their bids are treated as if they
were larger than they in fact are, 3) the
licenses are made sufficiently small (for
example, covering narrow geographical
areas) that their value is low relative to
the liquid assets of the small bidders, or
4) some licenses are set aside for bidding
by small firms only. The last of these
possibilities is the least appealing, since it
reduces competition for the licenses that
are set aside, thereby lowering revenue.
The other three options enhance competi-
tion, although making licenses small may
forsake economies of scale.
The FCC ultimately decided to set aside
a small number of licenses for compa-
nies with revenues below $125 million.
In addition, in many other auctions,
small businesses received bidding cred-
its (discounts) as high as 25 percent. The
size of the bidding credits depends on
the size of the firm as well as on the sex
and race of the owner. The use of install-
ment payments was also offered.
• Bidder Capability
The FCC would like to be certain that
service will begin in a timely fashion. As
such, it may wish to seek assurance that
bidders are capable of providing the
service. An engineer's report was re-
quired in the FCC lotteries of cellular
telephone licenses, spawning a cottage
industry that produced such reports. By
the end of the lottery, an application cost
approximately $650 to prepare, includ-
ing the application fee.
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2 Thus, it did
not represent much of a burden for the
participants, nor did it indicate capabil-
ity. In the PCS auctions, the FCC took a
different tack: Winners risk losing their
licenses if they have not installed net-
works serving one-third of the potential
customers within five years.
1
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• The Form of the Auction
Auctions can take many forms. For ex-
ample, objects can be sold sequentially or
simultaneously, and bidding can be open
or by sealed bid. A simultaneous auction
would allow firms to put together bids
for packages of licenses covering adja-
cent geographical areas, but may necessi-
tate withdrawal of bids if other bidders
are awarded some parts of the package.
A sequential auction would allow firms
to make bids knowing which licenses
they had already acquired, but it does not
give firms the opportunity to express
their valuations for packages of licenses.
The FCC decided to use a form of simul-
taneous auction for the large markets and
to use sequential auctions for the small
markets. Ultimately, differences in for-
mats are less important than the fact that
auctions of some form were held.
• The Initial Results
The FCC started the spectrum auctions
with the sale of 10 nationwide narrow-
band licenses. The auction commenced
on July 25, 1994, and took 46 rounds
and five days to complete. When it was
over, $617 million had been raised—10
times what the Congressional Budget
Office and the Office of Management
and Budget had predicted.
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4 No small
firms won nationwide licenses, how-
ever. (Bidding credits were offered on
three of the 10 licenses.) The revenue
raised in this initial offering bodes well
for the auction of the more valuable
broadband licenses.
• Conclusion
The auction of PCS licenses represents a
bold step forward, and the results from
the nationwide narrowband auctions are
promising. An auction is an appealing
method of allocating scarce resources
because it awards the object to the bid-
der who offers to pay the most, thus
maximizing social welfare while raising
revenue. If firms differ only in their cost
structure, then the low-cost firms should
win a large share of the auctions—the
efficient outcome.
A caveat is that some firms may have
low costs but be undercapitalized. The
use of installment payments or bidding
credits is a desirable response and is
preferable to the use of set-asides, which
arbitrarily limit the number of bidders
and thereby reduce revenue. The ultimate
test of the limited set-aside program
offered in the spectrum auctions will be
whether the successful small firms stay
in the market and flourish or sell their
licenses as soon as they are able.
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